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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
vs.

JEREMIAH RAY HART
Defendant/Appellant

Case No: 20180095-CA

INTRODUCTION
Nature And Context Of Dispute And Reasons Why
The Defendant Should Prevail On Appeal.

Defendant, Jeremiah Ray Hart, appeals from the October 3, 2017 jury trial verdict
of Aggravated Murder, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-202;
Obstructing Justice, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code§ 76-8-306-1; and
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony, in
violation ofUtah Code§ 76-10-503(2)(a). R.1987-1988.
The trial court sentenced the Defendant as follows: for Aggravated Murder, an
indeterminate term of twenty five years to life in the Utah State Prison; for Obstruction of
Justice, an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the
1

Utah State Prison; and for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by Restricted Person, an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison. R.2051-2054;R.4585-4583(4572-73). The court ordered that all sentences run
consecutive to prior commitments pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(3) and
consecutive to each other. Id. The trial court's Sentence, Judgment and Commitment is
included in Addendum A.
The Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of Appeals in an order issued
February 6, 2018. R.2082-2084. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)G), whereby the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over cases transferred from the Supreme Court.
The Defendant contends he should prevail on this appeal and a new trial be
granted for the following reasons:
The Defendant contends defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request a
mistrial when the state introduced evidence of two firearms, only one of which was
recovered in this case. An unrelated firearm was taken from Defendant during a traffic
stop and search weeks after the killing, and the state's forensics expert used it to show the
distinctive firing pin mark left by a Glock firearm, which was the same type of firearm
suspected in the murder.

The Defendant contends the jury would have been

unnecessarily confused and would have believed the firearm was that of the Defendant.
The relevance of the evidence presented by the State is indeed extremely questionable
2

and the probative value was undoubtedly outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
The Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's
failing to object and request a mistrial when a critical witness testified that the Defendant
was previously in prison for prior offenses. Counsel was further ineffective by engaging
in a wholly unreasonable strategy of emphasizing that the Defendant had been previously
convicted of an offense which was punishable by incarceration in the Utah State Prison.
There was no reason for this information to be disclosed.

Counsel was clearly

unprepared to meet the issue, which he should have easily foreseen, and it was reversible
error to allow such prejudice to infect the trial process when there was no necessity for
such testimony to be presented.
The Defendant contends it was ineffective assistance for defense counsel to fail to
request a mistrial when the jury came back asking for clarification as to whose DNA was
found on whose jacket, as testified to by the DNA expert. The DNA expert testified only
that Hart's DNA was found on a jacket that was tested, failing to state that it was the
Defendant's own jacket. A stipulated instruction was read to the jury stating the jacket
was the Defendant's immediately after the evidence was admitted, because it was going
to be another two days before a witness would testify that the jacket was the Defendant's,
and therefore render the evidence innocuous. The instruction was insufficient for the
jury, which came back during deliberations with the very question which had been the
source of the problem leading to the stipulation. However, the court would not permit
3

clarification during deliberations. This was prejudicial error.
The Defendant contends that it was ineffective assistance of counsel · where
defense counsel failed to object when the lead detective testified that blood spatters and
drops found in and about the victim's body matched the Defendant's DNA, where the
detective was not noticed or qualified as a blood pattern expert. The testimony led the
jury to conclude the victim and Defendant had been shot in a certain way, which was far
from his area of expertise and no doubt misled and confused the jury. The evidence was
prejudicial and should not have been allowed. But defense counsel failed to object.
Lastly, the cumulative effect of all identified and assumed errors must necessarily
undermine confidence in the verdict.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
AND GROUNDS FOR APPEAL.
I. A. Issue: Was defense counsel ineffective in failing to request a mistrial when
the State introduced evidence of two firearms, when only one of which was recovered in
this case. An unrelated firearm was taken from Defendant during a traffic stop and
search weeks after the killing, and the state's forensics expert used it to show the
distinctive firing pin mark left by a Glock firearm, which was the same type of firearm
suspected in the murder and recovered from Defendant, but it was determined they were
not the same firearms. The trial court gave a verbal instruction that the firearm was used
solely for comparison, and was not involved in the case. However, it took a conspicuous
4

sidebar to achieve this.

B. Standard of Review: An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law. To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a Defendant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively
deficient; and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient performance,
the Defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Kurr,
2012 UT App 194, ~ 2, 283 P.3d 995, 997

C. Preservation:

The issue respecting the gun, to which counsel objected,

occurred during the testimony of SL Police Crime Lab Firearms Expert, Derek Mears.
R.3888-3904. The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was not raised in the trial
court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal as an exception to the preservation
rule. State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 7 6, ~ 23.
II. A. Issue: Was it ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to object and ask for a
mistrial when key witness, Kary Carter, disclosed that he and Defendant were
incarcerated together before and during the trial? Was it ineffective assistance of counsel
to fail to object and request a mistrial when a critical witness testified that the Defendant
was previously in prison for prior offenses? Was counsel further ineffective by engaging
in an unreasonable strategy of emphasizing that the Defendant had been previously
convicted of an offense which was punishable by incarceration in the Utah State Prison?

B. Standard of Review: An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
5

first time on appeal presents a question of law. To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a Defendant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively
deficient; and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient performance,
the Defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Kurr,
,.

2012 UT App 194, ~ 2, 283 P.3d 995, 997.
C. Preservation: The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was not raised in

the trial court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal as an exception to the
preservation rule. State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ~ 23.
III. A. Issue: Was defense counsel ineffective in failing to request a mistrial when
the jury came back and asked for clarification as to whose DNA was found on whose
jacket?
B. Standard of Review: An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the

first time on appeal presents a question of law. To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a Defendant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively
deficient; and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient performance,
the Defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Kurr,
2012 UT App 194, ~ 2, 283 P.3d 995, 997.
C. Preservation: The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was not raised in

the trial court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal as an exception to the
preservation rule. State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76,
6

~

23. The DNA expert testified only

that Hart's DNA was found on a jacket that was tested without stating that it was Hart's
jacket. R.3 861. The parties stipulated to an instruction which was read to the jury stating
the jacket was Hart's after the evidence was admitted. R.3921. The jury had a question
about it during deliberations but the court would not permit clarification. The instruction
apparently was insufficient for the jury and counsel failed to move for a mistrial.

IV. A. Issue: Was defense counsel ineffective in failing to object when lead
detective testified that he believed a key blood drop (found under the victim's body) was
likely Hart's, when the sample was not tested for DNA, and the detective was not noticed
or qualified as a blood pattern expert?

B. Standard of Review: An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law. To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a Defendant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively
deficient; and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient performance,
the Defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Kurr,
2012 UT App 194, i! 2, 283 P.3d 995, 997.

C. Preservation: Detective Spangenburg testified to his conclusion regarding
blood spatters in and about the body of the deceased without objection from defense
counsel.

R.4166-4173, Addendum B.

Detective Spangenburg testified as an expert

regarding blood spatter evidence, without being qualified as such. A notice of expert
provided regarding his proposed testimony related solely to his proposed testimony as "to
7

his knowledge and experience regarding drug distribution practices and methodology."
R.735-736.

V. A. Issue: Did the cumulative effect of all the errors require reversal?
B. Standard of Review:

Reversal is required if the cumulative effect of all

identified and assumed errors undermines confidence in the verdict. State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993).

C. Grounds and Preservation: See Issues I through IV, supra.
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES.
The controlling constitutional provisions, statues and rules are included in
AddendumC.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEDURAL HISTORY NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
An Information, filed May 4, 2015, charged Defendant with Aggravated Murder, a

First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-202; Obstructing Justice, a First
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-8-306-1; and Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon by Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code § 7610-503(2)(a). R. 1-4. Notice of Intent to seek the death penalty was not filed. See
R.2484.
Use Immunity was granted for several witnesses who later appeared at preliminary

8

hearing and trial, Richard McDonald, Alyssa Henrie, Kandise Newby, and Kimberly
Martinez. R.78-79. Preliminary hearing was held November 4, 2015. R.94-97;R.21182480.

Defendant was bound over for trial on the Information as charged. R.96;R.2452.
Mr. Hart moved the trial court to hold Utah's aggravated murder statute facially

unconstitutional under article I, section 24, and article V, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution. R.165-192. The State responded. R.203-210. Argument was heard July
11, 2016.

R.2481-1552.

On July 27, 2016, the trial court issued its Memorandum

Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Declare Utah's Aggravated Murder
Statute Unconstitutional. R.235-248. This issue was considered in considerable depth by
the Utah Supreme Court which issued its decision on November 21, 2016, the gravamen
of which effectively renders moot and extinguishes the Defendant's argument. Met v.

State, 2016 UT 51,

~

52, 388 P.3d 447, 461 (Utah's dual-track sentencing structure for

those convicted of aggravated murder does not violate the federal and state constitution).
The defense moved to strike the panel on the basis that the jury venire did not
represent a fair cross-section of the community as required by the constitution and state

law. R.3211. The basic argument was the age of the venire was heavily skewed in favor
of 45 up to 65 years old and therefore a jury which would be far more conservative, set in
its ways, and less likely to acquit, i.e., the panel's socio-economic status was unfavorably
weighted against younger people. Id. Defendant correctly asserted that he had the right
to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. State v. Young,
9

853 P.2d 327, 338 (Utah 1993). On its face, the Defendant's criticism was well taken.
Two problems prevent effectively raising this claim on appeal. First, "courts do not
recognize geographical distribution or socio-economic status as a distinctive
classification or group for Sixth Amendment purposes." State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 339.
Secondly, the raw data was so unreliable and unpreserved that it is not possible to
demonstrate that the defense demonstrated a prima facie violation that a particular group
was insufficiently numerous and distinctive to be cognizable for fair cross-section
purposes. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 575-76 (Utah 1987). Indeed, the trial court
specifically stated,
At the end of the day, I do not find that any group has been excluded in the
selection process. I do not have enough evidence to show that there is. And
my general experience as a judge doing a lot of juries, again, I - I think I've
done about 15 this year, and that -- that's just this year, I -- I perceive that
we get a good cross-section of our community. In terms of the
representation in relation to the number of persons in the community, this
particular panel may be less representative than others that I've seen, but I
think that's a -- that's just a random -- the result of a random process. I've
tried to observe how the process has worked.
R.3261. It does not appear from the record that defense counsel demonstrated to the
contrary of the court's finding in this regard.

Ultimately, the court determined that

defense counsel had failed to establish a prima facie case of a violation of the Sixth
Amendment. R.3262-3263. In counsel's judgment, trial court error cannot be shown.
Mr. Hart moved the trial court pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 16, Utah R. Civ. P. 37,

and the due process clause of the Utah Constitution, to compel production of all non10

privileged officer notes and all records of contacts between State agents and witness
Richard McDonald, and to impose sanctions up to and including dismissal for destruction
of evidence by members of the prosecution team. R.280-307. Hearing, including taking
testimony, took place on November 28, 2016. R.2553-2662. The issue before the court
was whether there were notes taken by officers during the investigation that may not have
been preserved and if there were notes that were preserved, the court's order was that
"within seven days you're to provide either electronic or paper response describing what,
if any, notes are there." If there are handwritten notes, it may take slightly longer to get
them to counsel, but the State will at least provide the information. R.2639. Defense
counsel is directed to file an amended motion to narrow and focus the issues based upon
the evidence that's come in and proffers made. R.2640-41. A further evidentiary hearing
was held March 21, 2017 wherein the defense called several witnesses.

R.388-

390;R.2663-2774. Defendant defines the issue: "The bigger issue is that there's notes -an unwritten policy at Salt Lake City to destroy all notes. And that's -- the claims that I'm
making are a Tiedemann motion, Rule 37 spoliation motion, for us to have a proper
record here." R.2670. The State noted that no amended motion had been filed as the
court previously directed and requests defense be ordered to specifically address issues
with the evidence. R.2726. The court orders supplemental briefing. R.2728. Defendant
agrees that the State will submit a new order regarding discovery from the defense.
R.2734-2735.

Ultimately the Defendant withdrew, in writing, the motion to compel
11

discovery and sanctions for destruction of evidence. R.518-519.
The court held a hearing on several motions in limine on May 8, 2017. R.5 54555;R.2745-2778. The court's order is set forth R.567-569; See R.2478. The Defendant
stipulated to the State's motion allowing Utah R. Evid. 404(b) evidence that the
Defendant had sold, provided, purchased, and used illegal drugs. R.2745-2778, 2748;
R.567-569. As to the use State's motion to allow reference to the Defendant's nickname,
"bullet," the State withdrew its motion. R.2745-2778, 2748-2750: R.567-569.

Further

hearing on the 404(b) issue regarding Kary Carter's testimony of the Defendant's
participation in a prior robbery was heard June 27, 2017. R.752-755;R.2793-2887. The
trial court subsequently determined that the evidence regarding the Defendant's
participation in a prior robbery was admissible. Findings, Conclusion, and Order, R.848856. The Defendant petitioned for an interlocutory appeal from this Order. R.887-888.
The Court of Appeals granted the Petition. R.1739. The appeal became moot upon the
parties entering in to a stipulation to exclude the 404(b) robbery evidence. R.3022-3040,
3025;R.1790-1793, 1789. The State filed a notice of intent not to introduce the disputed
404(b) evidence in its case in chief. R.1760-1761.
The court heard Defendant's other Motions in Limine, a motion to exclude witness
tampering evidence, R.1613-16115, a motion to exclude inconclusive DNA test results,
R.1618-1621, and a motion to bifurcate the aggravating factors in the murder, R.16071610.

R.2983-3021.

The parties stipulated to exclude witness tampering evidence,
12

R.2985, the court granted the motion, R.2995, and to bifurcate the aggravating factors in
the murder. R.2985, 299l;R.1869-1870. Based upon stipulation of the parties regarding
the DNA evidence, the court determined that reference can be made to the test and
inconclusive results, "but there can be no inference drawn beyond what the expert has
stated in her report." R.2997;R1867-1868. Defense counsel withdrew the motion to
bifurcate the aggravating factor in the murder. R.2997. The aggravating factor was that
the homicide was "committed incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal
episode during which the actor committed or attempted to commit a robbery or
aggravated robbery." R.1.
Jury trial commenced September 25, 2017 and concluded October 3, 2017.
R.1885-1996;R.3041-4524. The jury found the Defendant guilty of Aggravated Murder,
a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-202; Obstructing Justice, a First
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code§ 76-8-306-1; and Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon by Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code § 7610-503(2)(a), as charged in the Information. R.1987-1988;R.4510-4583(4513-4516).
The trial court sentenced Mr. Hart as follows: for Aggravated Murder, an
indeterminate term of twenty-five years to life in the Utah State Prison; for Obstruction of
Justice, an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison; and for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by Restricted Person, an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
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Prison. R.2051-2054;R.4585-4583(4572-73). The court ordered that all sentences run
consecutive to prior commitments pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(3) and
consecutive to each other. Id.
Defendant timely appealed. R.2055-2056. The Utah Supreme Court transferred
the case to this Court. R.2086-2087. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (2008).
STATEMENT OF FACTS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
OVERVIEW
Christian McDonald was killed on January 24, 2015 in relation to his involvement
in a drug deal wherein he and his brother, Richard McDonald, arranged to sell five
pounds of marijuana to Erick Burwell and his associate. The other person, as alleged by
the State, was the Defendant, Jeremiah Ray Hart.

Mr. Hart did not testify and at all

times maintained through his counsel that, although he was present, 1 he was not involved
in the circumstances which resulted in the shooting death of Christian McDonald. There
were only two actual witnesses to the shooting incident, Richard McDonald and Erick
Burwell.
THE TRIAL
1

"We're going to talk about a slug, a slug that was fired and -- and actually went through
Mr. Hart's face. They (the State) are going to link that to him. He had a -- he had a bullet
go through his face. So there is DNA out there that actually links him to this scene. He
admits he was there .... " Defense Counsel's Opening Statement, R.3314.
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Erick Burwell testified that he had an extensive criminal history. R. 3319. He
agreed to testify to his roll in the homicide in exchange for pleading guilty to
manslaughter and a robbery, both second degree felonies. R.3421-3422.

A couple of

months prior to January 24, 2015, Erick, introducing himself as Michael, made the
acquaintance of Kandice Newby, a probationer, with whom he exchanged drugs three or
four times and gave her rides. R.3322-3324;R.2531-33. Erick asked Kandice if she
could come up with five pounds of marijuana, that he had a buyer and both could profit.
R.3532-2534;R3324-25. Kandice texted Alyssa Henrie who was also on ankle monitor
with her and gave her Erick's number so Alyssa could give it to her contact. R.35373538. Kandice asked Alyssa if she knew anyone who could get 5lbs of marijuana.
R.3538.

Kandice's friend, Garrett Pitkin, was at her house and overheard them talking

about the deal and wanted to get involved. R.3339. He was willing to pick up her share
since she couldn't leave with the ankle monitor. Id. They made a deal if he went and
picked up her share of the money, she would give him part of it. R.3540. She put Garret
Pitkin and Erick Burwell in contact. Id.
After he was released from prison in 2014, Erick ran into the Defendant in West
Valley. R.3320. They had been associates for years. R.3321. Erick testified that he
arranged the robbery on January 24, 2015. R.3321. He maintained he talked to Mr. Hart
on the phone about setting up a deal for 5 pounds of marijuana, that he had a person for
the robbery. R.3328. According to Erick, the Defendant was to bring a gun; Erick
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claimed he was not to bring one. R.3329. Eventually, through various intermediaries,
Erick was able to set up the deal through Shawn Runyan, who located the McDonald
brothers as potential sellers of the drug. R.3601-3604.
After he was released from prison in 2014, Erick Burwell ran into Mr. Hart with
whom he was a long time acquaintance. R.3320. Burwell testified that he arranged the
robbery the day of January 24, 2015. R.3321. Kandise Newby and others were involved,
but did not know the Erick Burwell intended a robbery. Id.
Burwell set the robbery up in a phone call to Jeremiah Hart. R.3328. He told Mr.
Hart it was for five pounds of weed and that he was to bring a gun. R.3328-3329.
Burwell spoke to a friend ofKandise Newby on January 24, 2015. R.3330. He could not
recall his name. Id. The friend called later that day and indicated he had a potential
seller with five pounds. R.3332. According to his testimony, Erick and the Defendant
intended to rob these sellers of the marijuana and cut everyone else out of the deal.
R.3325, 3327. They picked a location in Sugar House to meet, in the parking lot near
several businesses. R.3332-3333. Erick said to meet him by the Red Lobster. R.3333.
Jeremiah Hart was there when he arrived. Id.
Adam Sandoval, who assisted in setting up the sale, arranged through Kandise
Newby that the sellers would show up in Sugarhouse by the Red Lobster. R.3581-3582.
Shawn Runyan picked up Adam Sandoval and went to Shawn's friends' house. R.3583.
They then got in the friends' car. Id. There were two of them, brothers (the McDonald
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Brothers), whose names Adam could not recall. R.3584. Adam noticed a backpack was
by the feet of the passenger. Id. They drove up to the parking lot in Sugarhouse by the
Red Lobster. R.3585. Adam texted Kandise Newby to let her know they were there. Id.
A friend of Kandise Newby, Garret Pitkin, also one of the many intermediaries who
expected to make some money, drove to the Sugarhouse Parking lot at about the same
time as the others. R.3638, 3646. He met Erick Burwell, whom he knew as Michael,
there. R.3646. The others, Adam, Shawn and the brothers showed up and he met them
for the first time. R.3649.
Adam testified that he observed another man, bald, Hispanic, heavier set, in the
parking lot near a car. R.3587. Erick Burwell testified that he arrived and Kandice
Newby's friend (Garret Pitkin) arrived alone.

R.3336.

Garret told him Christian

McDonald is on the way and shortly he arrived with his brother, Richard McDonald,
whom he had never met before. R.3337. The brothers were driving their car and Adam
wanted the stranger (Erick) to get in their car, but he refused. R.3587. The Latino man
insisted that they get into his car.

R.3339, 3588.

They didn't want to at first, but

eventually ended up getting in, both into the backseat. Id. Garret Pitkin also tried to get
in with the Latino man, who was in fact Erick Burwell. R.3650. But he was refused. Id.
Erick had one brother sit behind him, the other in the passenger seat because he didn't
want them both behind him. R.3341. The car then pulled away leaving Adam and
Shawn waiting in their car and Garret in his car. R.3588, 3651-3652.
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Erick then told them that, "this dude's going to get in, he's going to check the
weed, we're going to count the money." R.3440. "The plan was for us to go down the
street and just, you know, jack them, rob them .... It was no plan for nobody to get shot.
The plan was to pull out a gun and to, you know -- to after these were some kids, you
know, they would get scared, give us the weed and leave, you know."

Id.

Erick

explained that, "(t)he robbery is, I get them in the car, get them to where we need, you
know, get them to where Jeremiah is, Jeremiah gets in, we take them for a ride." R.34413442. The Defendant was to sit in the back seat behind the passenger so he could control
the person in front of Erick and the person on the side of him. R.3442, 3446-3447. The
Defendant was at the Olive Garden with his wife. R.3441.
Erick Burwell met the McDonald brothers for the first time that day in the Red
Lobster parking lot. R.3423, 3427. Christian McDonald was in the passenger seat.
R.3426.

His brother Richard McDonald was seated directly behind Erick Burwell.

R.3427. They then drove from the Red Lobster parking lot to the Olive Garden parking
lot where Jeremiah was sitting outside. R.3444. They met the Defendant at the Olive
Garden and he got in the car. R.3424-3425. He sat in the back passenger seat. R.3445.
Jeremiah Hart was seated directly behind Christian McDonald and next to Richard
McDonald in the back seat of Erick Burwell's vehicle. R.3427. Christian was holding
the backpack of marijuana at that point.

R.3443.

Erick testified that he knew the

Defendant had a gun, a Glock with an extended magazine. R.3447, 3553.
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Erick testified that he told them all he didn't want to do the deal in a parking lot
and so started driving. R.3448. They then travelled South on 13th East, to Parkway
Avenue to the middle of the block and then flipped a U-tum so that the car was facing
east. R.3428-3430. It was the first street that he could tum on, the plan being to rob the
brothers and let them walk back to their car. R.3348.

It was all Erick's

plan~

R.3349.

Then, as Erick testified, "first off they gave us the marijuana, so Jeremiah opened it to
look at it, make sure it was good marijuana. So by the time we got to the residential street
and I turned around and parked, Jeremiah was already out with the -- with the pistol."
R.3350.

Erick explained that "Jeremiah never was going to shoot them. It wasn't until

he got shot that he shot ... " R.3553. So "Jeremiah pulls out the pistol, tells them, 'It's a
robbery, it's a jack move, you know, everybody out of the car."' R.3553-3554. Jeremiah
at that point put the gun over on Richard's head. R.3355. According to Erick, Richard
froze in the back seat. R.3554.
Christian started to get out of the car and as soon as he started getting out of the
car, he pulled out a gun and shot Jeremiah in the back seat. Id. He shot before he got out

of the car. R.3356. Christian didn't hesitate, just pulled his gun out and shot Jeremiah.
R.3356.

Jeremiah then shot right back, like "a reflex;" as soon as Christian shot,

Jeremiah shouted, "ah," tried to get out of the car and shot back. R.3355, 3359. Erick
didn't see how Jeremiah shot Christian. R.3359. Erick described the action as follows:
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Christian gets of the car as soon as -- so fast, like, the rapid shot was like
boom, boom. Like, Christian got out of the car, Jeremiah got out of the car
together and I gave -- like, I hit the steering wheel with -- and I hit the gas
pedal at the same time to get away, because I didn't - I didn't know that
Richard was still in the car with me.
R.3355. It happened so fast Erick did not see Jeremiah get hit. R.3358. He saw that
Christian was shot in the chest. R.3360. He heard only two gunshots in very rapid
succession. R.3362. Both Christian and the Defendant were then out of the car and Erick
tried to take off as fast as 1possible. R.3363.
After the shooting occurred Richard got in the front seat with the marijuana, Eric
made a right and headed southbound on thirteenth East. R.3430, 3364-65. Richard told
Erick he had a gun and Erick wanted him in the front seat where he could see him.
R.3365. Richard wanted to be taken home and Erick took him to his home, dropping him
off on 1300 West and 3500 South. R.3364-3665.
Eventually Shawn got a call informing them that it was a setup and to get out of
there. R.3589. They left at that point and Shawn's wife picked them up. Id. Garret also
called Erick, who told him someone ha? been shot, that it all went bad, and sounding

frantic. R. 3652, 3654, 3367.
Richard McDonald tells a story similar to the other eye witness, Erick Burwell.
Richard "Malcolm" McDonald testified that he and his brother sold marijuana together.
R.4072. He testified that on January 24, 2015 he was contacted by Shawn, his friend,
that he had a buyer who needed 5 lbs of marijuana. R.4073. Shawn came over, had he
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and Christian McDonald follow him to a friend's house to pick up somebody else.
R.4074. They had the weed already. Id. He put the marijuana in a blue backpack.
R.4075. He testified that he had a .40 caliber pistol, and carried it in his pants. Id. His
brother also had a gun. Id.
Richard, Shawn, and his brother drove to pick up another person he didn't know.
R.4076-4077. From there they drove to the Sugarhouse parking lot and met someone by
the Red Lobster. R.4078. Shawn talked to this person and returned saying they needed
to get in his car, which felt weird and they did not want to do. R.4079-4980. Richard got
in the back seat behind the driver, whom they had never met, and Christian got in the
passenger seat. R.4081. They then drove to the Olive Garden to pick up another person
who gets in the back seat with him. R.4082. Richard identifies this person as the
Defendant in the courtroom. R.4083. They wanted to go somewhere more private, so
they headed out from there and went down 1300 East, and turned down one of the first
small streets, Parkway Avenue. Id. On the way Richard unzipped the backpack and
showed Jeremiah the bags of marijuana. R.3484. The car u-tumed, they parked in the
street, "(a)nd then that was the point the passenger had pulled a gun out of his hoody."
R.4085. It was a pistol. R.4086. He points it at Richard about a foot from his head and
said, "This is a robbery." Id. Richard testified, "So at that moment, I just kind of froze.
Like my whole body went cold. And I just put my hands up and just stood still." R.4087.
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Richard claimed that he was stunned, and that he did not grab his own gun.
R.4087. But he saw Christian moving for his gun. Id. Here the stories between Erick
Burwell and Richard McDonald diverge. Richard testified, "So at that point, when I saw
my brother reaching for his gun, the passenger, the guy who pulled the gun on me,
reaches around my brother with his left arm, holds him to the seat, and reaches around
with his right arm and shoots him." R.4087-4088. He heard one or two gunshots.
R.4089. But he claims he never saw Christian's gun. Id. He could not recall if it was the
passenger or his brother who got out of the car first. R.4090. He claims he never pulled
his gun out. Id.
The next thing Richard experiences after both his brother and the passenger are
out of the car, they are driving down the street and he is wondering what just happened.
R.4091. When the driver asks him to get in the front he climbed over and got in the front
seat. Id. He then was taken home. R.4093.
When Richard was first interviewed by the police, he told them he didn't have a
gun. R.4094. When confronted with Erick Burwell's statement, he eventually told the

police about having a gun. R.4095, 4126. He then claimed he had taken it out in the
desert, broken it down and scattered the pieces to get rid of it. R.4094-4095.

He even

went out with police nearly 8-9 months after him telling them about it to look for it,
unsuccessfully, in the desert in March 2016. R.4132. He got rid of the marijuana also.
R.4095.
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At the scene of the shooting an expended 9 mm shell casing was found, but no
compatible bullet. R.3691-3692. A Glock magazine holding 9 mm ammunition, but no
gun, was found at the scene. R.3689. A Taurus PT145, .45 caliber semiautomatic
handgun was recovered at the scene.

R.3688-3690.

Exhibit 22 was a fired bullet,

presumably from the Taurus. R.3690. A Taurus holds only .45 ammunition. R.3689 .
.45 ammunition is not interchangeable with 9mm ammunition. Id.
The medical examiner performed an autopsy on the body of Christian McDonald
on January 25th, 2015 at 7 :28 am. R. 3813. An internal and external examination was
performed. Id.

Two specific injuries noted, gunshot entrance wound on right-upper

chest and exit wound on mid back that was just to the left of spine. R.3 815. His only
chance of survival would have been instant medical intervention. R.3828. Even so,
Christian McDonald's survival would have been unlikely. Id. His time of death was put
at January 24th at 7:32 p.m. R.3832.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant contends defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request a

mistrial when the state introduced evidence of two firearms, only one of which was
recovered in this case. An unrelated firearm was taken from Defendant during a traffic
stop and search weeks after the killing, and the state's forensics expert used it to show the
distinctive firing pin mark left by a Glock firearm, which was the same type of firearm
suspected in the murder.

The Defendant contends the jury would have been
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unnecessarily confused and would have believed the firearm was that of the Defendant.
The relevance of the evidence presented by the State is indeed extremely questionable
and the probative value was undoubtedly outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
The Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's
failing to object and request a mistrial when a critical witness testified that the Defendant
was previously in prison for prior offenses. Counsel was further ineffective by engaging
in a wholly unreasonable strategy of emphasizing that the Defendant had been previously
convicted of an offense which was punishable by incarceration in the Utah State Prison.
There was no reason for this information to be disclosed.

Counsel was clearly

unprepared to meet the issue, which he should have easily foreseen, and it was reversible
error to allow such prejudice to infect the trial process when there was no necessity for
such testimony to be presented.
The Defendant contends it was ineffective assistance for defense counsel to fail to
request a mistrial when the jury came back asking for clarification as to whose DNA was
found on whose jacket, as testified to by the DNA expert. The DNA expert testified only

that Hart's DNA was found on a jacket that was tested, failing to state that it was the
. Defendant's own jacket. A stipulated instruction was read to the jury stating the jacket
was the Defendant's immediately after the evidence was admitted, because it was going
to be another two days before a witness would testify that the jacket was the Defendant's,
and therefore render the evidence innocuous. The instruction was insufficient for the
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jury, which came back during deliberations with the very question which had been the
source of the problem leading to the stipulation. However, the court would not permit
clarification during deliberations. This was prejudicial error.
The Defendant contends that it was ineffective assistance of counsel where
defense counsel failed to object when the lead detective testified that blood spatters and
drops found in and about the victim's body matched the Defendant's DNA, where the
detective was not noticed or qualified as a blood pattern expert. The testimony led the
jury to conclude the victim and Defendant had been shot in a certain way, which was far
from his area of expertise and no doubt misled and confused the jury. The evidence was
prejudicial and should not have been allowed. But defense counsel failed to object.
Lastly, the cumulative effect of all identified and assumed errors must necessarily
undermine confidence in the verdict.
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT CONTENDS THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO REQUEST A MISTRIAL WHEN THE STATE
INTRODUCED EVIDENCE OF TWO FIREARMS, ONLY ONE OF WHICH
WAS RECOVERED IN THIS CASE. AN UNRELATED FIREARM WAS TAKEN
FROM DEFENDANT DURING A TRAFFIC STOP AND SEARCH WEEKS
AFTER THE KILLING, AND THE STATE'S FORENSICS EXPERT USED IT
TO SHOW THE DISTINCTIVE FIRING PIN MARK LEFT BY A GLOCK
FIREARM, WHICH WAS THE SAME TYPE OF FIREARM SUSPECTED IN
THE MURDER. THE DEFENDANT CONTENDS THE JURY WOULD HAVE
BEEN UNNECESSARILY CONFUSED AND WOULD HAVE BELIEVED THE
FIREARM WAS THAT OF THE DEFENDANT.
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Detective Gordon Parks testified that Exhibit 16, a Taurus PT145, .45 caliber
semiautomatic handgun was recovered at the scene. R.3688-3690;R.3708. A 9 mm
magazine was discovered at the scene. R.3710;R.351 l. Only one gun, the Taurus, was
found at the scene, the other being lost. R.351 l;R.3686-3690;R.3888. A Glock magazine
holds only 9mm ammunition, and the magazine found at the scene was consistent with a
Glock handgun. R.3686-3692.
not a 9 mm.

Exhibit 22, fired bullet, was found at the scene; it was

R.3692. No 9mm bullet found at scene. Id. A fired bullet, Exhibit 22,

presumably from the Taurus, was recovered from the scene. R.3690.
The confusion in this matter arises from the fact that Derek Mears, Salt Lake
Police Crime Lab Firearms Expert, testified that he examined two firearms which he had
received in evidence. R.3886-3887. He first tested the Taurus firearm: "I examined this
particular firearm and another firearm that was submitted as well." R.3887.
Mr. Mears commenced to testify regarding a slight malfunction he observed in the

trigger mechanism of the .45 caliber Taurus. R.3887-3888. Defense counsel called for a
bench conference. The discussion went as follows:
(Bench Conference.)
MR. JOHNSON: He just asked ifthat was Jeremiah Hart's.
THE COURT: What?
MR. JOHNSON: He just asked how many firearms he examined in this
case. One of them was picked up off of the Defendant after the fact.
MR. HANSEN: Yeah, I'm only going into this firearm.
MR. JOHNSON: I just -- now we have to have a firearm out there that
we're not going to talk about.
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THE COURT: Well, the only evidence I think we've had is that there is one
firearm from the scene, the other one was lost.
MR. HANSEN: Right. So I'm only asking about the Taurus.
THE COURT: So let's be clear: You're not going to go into another firearm
that may have been -MR. HANSEN: No. We will only talk about the -THE COURT: -- received from some other person or from the Defendant.
MR. HANSEN: Yeah. I intentionally did not - I moved up [inaudible]
would not be -MR. JOHNSON: I just don't want [inaudible].
THE COURT: Okay.
(End of Bench Conference.)
R.3888-3889.

Momentarily, the issue seems to have been addressed.

Mr. Mears

testified regarding the .45 caliber bullet, recovered from the scene, which he examined,
which he concluded was fired from the Taurus found at the scene. R.3 890-3 891.
Shortly thereafter, confusion arose again during Mr. Mears examination. The
problem arose as follows:
Q. (BY MR. HANSEN:) I'm showing you what's been already
been admitted as State's Exhibit 122.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you recall, or do you know what that is?
A. Yes. That's a photo I took to show the comparison of Item 43, which is
on the right side of that photograph versus a test fired cartridge case from

another firearm that I received.

R.3891-3892 (Emphasis added). Again defense counsel called for a bench conference.
R.3892. The court thereupon excused the jury and a lengthy dialogue ensued about the
relevance, necessity, and potential for a mistrial if the second gun received in evidence
were connected to the Defendant. R.3895-3904 (Addendum D). The court noted that if
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that were to happen, the State would be risking a mistrial. R.3 899. Defense counsel also
noted, regardless of any curative pronouncements from the bench, that the damage had
been done: ''I think the cat is out of the bag at this point. We're talking about he's seen
two guns as a part of this case." R.3901.
After the lengthy conference, the court determined that the problem could be
solved wherein the parties would enter into a stipulation. The discussion follows:
MR. JOHNSON: Well, I don't know why you're using actual evidence
instead of using something from Google to show that comparison.
MR. EVERSHED: Because it just -- it just demonstrate. It's something that
he created. It just demonstrates it. It's just a demonstrative -- it really is.
THE COURT: So let's be clear. The stipulation is that he received another
9mm that has no connection to this case. And when I say "no connection to
the case," that's true.
MR. EVERSHED: It's true.
THE COURT: Because the fact that it came from the Defendant in this case
or from anybody else is really not relevant. So I will just direct you to state
on the record that there is a comparison gun. We stipulate there is a
comparison gun used and to demonstrate how a different manufacturer's
firearm, a 9mm creates a different impression on a shell.
MR. JOHNSON: On that end, feel free to lead in into that.
MR. HANSEN: Yeah. Yeah. In fact -THE COURT: Okay. And that's -- so does that resolve this issue?
MR. EVERSHED: Yes.
THE COURT: Assuming -- you do that. And I will direct you to lead the
witness on that issue to make clear it's a comparison firearm that has no
connection to this case.
MR. JOHNSON: That's fine.
THE COURT: Both sides agree. Okay.

28

R.3903-3904. That did not entirely end the discussion however. Subsequently the court
enquired about the stipulation and the exhibit, Exhibit 122, the "comparison" gun.
R.3917. Thereupon further discussion took place as follows:
THE COURT: Can you state into a microphone, Counsel. What the exhibit
-- what the stipulation is?
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, when I put the witness back up there I'm
going to lead the witness. He is going to -- I'm going to direct his attention
to -- if I could just use this. I'm going direct his attention to this.
THE COURT: And you're pointing to an exhibit-MR. HANSEN: To this casing -- so if you look at this, it's the left casing, if
you're looking at Exhibit-22.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HANSEN: I'm going to ask him if that is a comparison gun that was
found and available in the lab that's unrelated to this case.
THE COURT: Okay. Does that work?
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, that does work but we just want to put on
the record that we objected to the eliciting of testimony from the witness
that there were two guns provided to him for examination.
THE COURT: I understood the stipulation would include that that second
gun he referred to is the gun used for that test.
MR. JOHNSON: Certainly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is that what you agreed to?
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, correct. When I point to the casing of the
gun issue I want to say that's a comparison gun that's available in the lab.
It's not related to this case.
THE COURT: But he said -- I understood the stipulation would also go to

the discussion of him receiving two guns in the case. Were you going to
clarify that the second gun was the comparison gun?
MR. HANSEN: Right. And I can -- that's what I'm going to do as well. I'm
just going to say the casing and the gun are just comparison guns, they are
not affiliated with the case.
THE COURT: And that that is the second gun that he referred to in his
testimony?
MR. HANSEN: Correct.
MR. JOHNSON: And that's what we understand, Your
Honor, and we're okay with that ....
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R.3917-3919. So while defense counsel agreed to the stipulation, he made clear that he
objected to the testimony regarding two guns in the first instance. R.3918.
The subject was dealt with by the State as follows:
Q. (BY MR. HANSEN:) ... But when we talk about two guns, one of those
guns was a comparison gun just available to you in the lab; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. It is not affiliated with this case?
A. That's correct.
R.3921.
The Defendant contends the evidence was prejudicial by introducing it in the first
place, to which appropriate objection was lodged. But the persistence of the issue and the
amount of perseveration devoted to the subject leant further error to what was already a
problem, which the "stipulation" that the State's explanation did not solve. It is the
Defendant's position that the trial was tainted by this evidence, that defense counsel was
remiss in not sticking to his guns and standing by his initial objection and requesting a
mistrial.
The reason for the State presenting this "demonstrative" evidence is highly suspect
in the first place. It had very little relevance to the issues in the case. Even given the low
standard for determining relevance under Utah R. Evid. 402, it is difficult to understand
what the testimony demonstrated.

"The court may exclude relevant evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
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unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. The evidence, it may be
said, was likely to run afoul of most if not all of these problems. To say the least, it was
unfairly prejudicial, confusing, misleading, and a waste of time. It should not have been
allowed.
For the reason stated, defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Defendant, by this reference, incorporates the full discussion of the principles related
to ineffective assistance of counsel and failure to request a mistrial as is set forth in Point

11.B.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT CONTENDS HE RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO OBJECT AND REQUEST A MISTRIAL
WHEN A CRITICAL WITNESS TESTIFIED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
PREVIOUSLY IN PRISON FOR PRIOR OFFENSES. COUNSEL WAS
FURTHER INEFFECTIVE BY ENGAGING IN AN UNREASONABLE
STRATEGY OF EMPHASIZING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN
PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE WHICH WAS PUNISHABLE BY
INCARCERATION IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON.
A. KARY CARTER'S TESTIMONY.
Kary Carter was a witness called by the State.

R.3926.

Mr. Carter was

convicted of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in 2012, and theft by receiving
stolen property and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person in 2014.
R.3928-29. On both matters Carter was placed on probation. Id. On or before January
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24, 2015, Carter's probation was revoked and he was then facing five to life. R.3929. He
conceded that he should have gone back to prison for a long time.
Mr. Carter had many life-threatening illnesses, liver cancer and hepatitis,
diagnosed in 2002; Clonus, a nerve disease; Ankylosing Spondylitis, a spine disease;
Multiple Sclerosis; and at the time of his testimony had been in a wheel chair for two and
a half years. R.3930-3931. Kary testified that he agreed with the Defendant that he
would say that he shot him. R.3941-3942. He indicated that the Defendant never told
him that he shot someone else although he indicate that he shot back. R.3946. Kary told
the police several different versions, one of which was that he was there at the shooting
and shot the other individual. R.3 94 7. Because of his terminal condition he didn't care
at the time and was trying to protect the Defendant. Id. He told Jeremiah it was fine to
bring him into it, "but I never said you can tell them that I killed somebody. I said you
can tell them I was there [inaudible] time, other than that, tell somebody that I killed him
[inaudible]. I never agreed to that part of it." R.3948-3949. He reiterated that he told the
Defendant could his name to buy some time, but never said for him to say that he, Kary,
actually shot anybody. R.3951.
At a point in time, Mr. Carter testified as follows:
[inaudible] both times I was still -- I was still trying to protect him. We
were out here in a situation where I'm going to prison [inaudible] same
room [inaudible]. See, yeah, if I sat there and I made up whatever to have
to protect myself. So, yeah, at that time they had me in a cell with a person
who was taking care of me.
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R.3960. Counsel withdrew his question and backed off of this line of cross-examination
at that point. Id. However, it was clear there was concern on the part of the defense
counsel that oblique reference had been made to

~he

Defendant taking care of him.

Immediately after this response came in, a bench conference was called:
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor-- hold on a second.
THE WITNESS: Huh?
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, can we have a sidebar?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Bench Conference.)
MR. JOHNSON: I think perhaps MR. EVERSHED: He didn't identify him.
MR. JOHNSON: [Inaudible] I think we need toMR. EVERSHED: If I think if we draw anymore attention. Let's just finish
the witness and then let's address it.
MR. JOHNSON: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.
(End of Bench Conference.)
Q. (BY MR. JOHNSON:) Mr. Carter, you can strike that last question.
R. 3960-3961. Defense counsel was clearly concerned about letting the jury know that
the Defendant had been in prison on a matter other than the instant case.
However, later during cross-examination, the following colloquy took place:

Q. All right. So and -- without getting into details, I think you told me that - that Mr. Hart has taken care of you through a lot of medical conditions; is
that correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. And -- and did he -- he let you live with him before all this happened?
A. Yeah. As soon as they're violate -- they violated his parole.
Q. All right. You guys -- before all of this happened, you two lived together
onA. Yeah.
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Q. -- on the streets, yeah? And he -- he helped take care of you, and for how
long? How long in your life did Jeremiah Hart help take care of you?
A. Do you think it's a -- a few times take care of a few situations when I
was a kid and then just recently. And then I've been locked up the majority
of my life, so it's been off and on pretty much here and there.

R.3964.
Rather than take the appropriate course of action at this point in time, which
would have been to move for a mistrial based upon the witness indication that the
Defendant had been on parole and was in prison for a parole violation, after the State
examined Mr. Carter on redirect, defense counsel dug in deeper with the following:
Q. So elephant in the room, you and Jeremiah spent a
year in prison together after this happened, correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. You're actually cellmates?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you're in a wheelchair?
A. Yeah.
Q. And he was your ADA assistant?
A. Yeah.
Q. He took care of you?
A. Yeah.
Q. He is your caretaker?
A.Yeah.

R.3971-3972. Defense counsel then inquired about his knowledge of the Defendant's
case, "(I)n a year as cellmates you never had a conversation?"

R.3973.

Counsel

continued to stress his access to the Defendant's case information, to which the witness
responded at one point, "It was in the room. Yeah, we're cellies. But no, I have no ... I
ain't never read his paperwork." Id. The testimony made clear that the witness and
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Defendant had known each other and been friends their entire lives, since childhood.
R.3974. Defense counsel continued to hammer it home, " ... you guys never had a
conversation about this case while you're in prison together?" Id. On re-direct, the State
emphasized that the essential, in fact, according to the witness, the sole, conversation
about what Kary would tell the police and about the case took place outside of prison.
R.3935.
The trial court was obviously concerned about defense counsel's examination in
regard to the Defendant being in prison with the witness, prompting the following
colloquy after the witness was excused:
THE COURT: I just -- at a sidebar just want to make clear on the record,
there was a decision made by defense counsel to introduce the issue MR. JOHNSON: That he was in prison.
THE COURT: That he was in prison since the time of the alleged crime.
And I assume based upon seeing this that was a decision you made after
consulting with your - your client as part of a decision as to how to crossexamine this witness?
MR. JOHNSON: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted that to be clear.
MR. JOHNSON: And because it came out three times during ahead of time
so ...
THE COURT: It terms of that wentMR. JOHNSON: Yeah, in terms ofTHE COURT: In your cross-examination.
MR. JOHNSON: -- before I made that decision, yeah.
THE COURT: And I didn't hear it come out on the State's examination of
the witness.
MR. EVERSHED: No. No. Nothing came out on the State's THE COURT: Okay. I just want to make sure the record is clear on that.
MR. JOHNSON: Certainly. That this was not some kind of mistake or issue
like that, it was a strategic decision the defense has made in consultation
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with the Defendant. Just wanted the record to be clear on that, to make sure
I'm not misunderstanding.
R.3936-3997.
The Defendant contends that two observations should be made. One, it is the
Defendant's contention that it is patently obvious from the entire course of defense
counsel's cross-examination that he had never sought to interview this witness or
attempted to determine beforehand to what the witness might testify. Secondly, Mr. Hart
contends that it is evident that defense counsel was initially concerned that the jury might
infer from the witness' testimony that he was being cared for in prison by the Defendant
at a time when the Defendant was also thusly incarcerated.

R.3960.

Thirdly, the

Defendant contends that defense counsel was surprised, and not prepared, for the witness'
testimony to the effect that the Defendant's parole had been violated, R.3964. He so
much as admitted this fact, "MR. JOHNSON ... because it came out three times during
ahead of time so ... THE COURT: In your cross-examination. MR. JOHNSON: -before I made that decision, yeah."

In other words, defense counsel was unprepared for this witness testimony in
general and unprepared for the inevitability that unless counsel was extremely
circumspect, and/or the witness was fully apprised of the fact that he should not mention
the Defendant's incarceration in any way, the fact that they were in prison together would
come out. It was no doubt of little help to the conference counsel had with his client
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about fully bringing the subject to the fore that he had waived his opportunity to object,
take some curative action, and make a motion for a mistrial. On that latter subject, he
could have conferred with his client intelligently - as to whether such a motion should be
made.

But after the subject has been allowed to come in before the jury, without

objection, it is really too late to discuss a strategy of letting it all hang out without being
disingenuous with one's client. It got past defense counsel, and the only thing he could
tell his client was that he had a choice to just let it go or talk about the "elephant in the
room."
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." This Court
has stated the basic principles of Ineffective assistance of counsel as follows:
~

13 Criminal Defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984). To prove a claim
of ineffective assistance, the Defendant must show (1) "'that counsel's
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness' "and (2) '"that but for counsel's deficient performance there
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
different.' "See State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ~ 68, 152 P.3d 321 (quoting
State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ~ 64, 125 P.3d 878). "Failure to satisfy
either component of this test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim." State v. C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, ~ 13, 250 P.3d 69, cert. denied,
255 P .3d 684 (Utah 2011). However, if the Defendant succeeds on a claim
of ineffectiveness, he will be entitled to a new trial. See State v. Hales,
2007 UT 14, ~ 68, 152 P.3d 321. *4
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if 14 Under the deficiency prong, trial counsel's performance is "presumed
to be part of a sound trial strategy ... within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, if 13 (omission in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This presumption may be
overcome only if there is a "lack of any conceivable tactical basis for
counsel's actions." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,
we "will assume trial counsel acted effectively if a rational basis for
counsel's performance can be articulated." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).

if 15 Under the prejudice prong, '"[a] reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' "State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "The
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 ....
State v. King, 2012 UT App 203 (2012).

"The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in
the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to
accord Defendants the "ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution" to which
they are entitled."

Strickland 466 U.S. 684-85. "The very premise of our adversary

system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best
promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." It is
that "very premise" that underlies and gives meaning to the Sixth Amendment. It "is
meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process." United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 655-56, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2045 (1984).

Effective assistance therefor is

measured by reference to the functioning of the adversary system in the particular case.
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I.e., it must be truly adversarial. The critical question is therefore whether counsel's
performance was so deficient that the process "lost its character as a confrontation
between adversaries," producing an "actual breakdown in the adversary process." United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654 - 58 (Internal cites omitted).

These seminal and

paradigmatic cases, Strickland and Cronic, put into bold relief the issue of counsel's
performance in this matter.
Counsel had a duty of diligence and to conduct a thorough investigation. "To
determine whether "counsel's performance was objectively reasonable in light of all the
circumstances, we look to prevailing professional norms. In accordance with these norms,
our cases recognize that counsel has an important duty to adequately investigate the
underlying facts of the case." This is "because investigation sets the foundation for
counsel's strategic decisions about how to build the best defense." State v. J.A.L., 2011
UT 27,

~

27, 262 P.3d 1, 8. The Court in J.A.L. specifically referred to State v. Hales,

2007 UT 14, ~ 69, 152 P.3d 321, 338, which quoted Strickland:
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely
to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations
on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
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The admissibility of a prior conviction of a felony is permissible only for the
purpose of impeachment. The Utah Rules of Evidence provide:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only
if the crime ( 1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the Defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Utah R. Evid., Rule 609. This is the only available avenue to admit a prior felony
conviction. That rule certainly had no applicability to the circumstances involved in this
instance. Impeachment of Kary Carter was not the basis upon which he testified to being
in prison at the same time as the Defendant. He blurted out that the Defendant's parole
had been violated. R.3964. Nothing could be more damaging in a case where the facts
were so indeterminate. This was not a case of overwhelming evidence. On the contrary,
it is an open question, with at least the McDonald brothers both being armed, as to who
shot whom.
Trial courts have discretion to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial. State v.
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ii 325, 299 P.3d 892, 980, citing State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ii 45,

24 P.3d 948. "In exercising its discretion, the trial court should not grant a mistrial
except where the circumstances are such as to reasonably indicate that a fair trial cannot
be had and that a mistrial is necessary in order to avoid injustice." To demonstrate
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prejudice, a "Defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. State v. Craft, 2017 UT App 87,
~

28, 397 P.3d 889, 896.
Much as in State v. Craft, where a detective improperly testified to a co-

Defendant' s statement implicating Craft, counsel's failure to move for a mistrial was
prejudicial. It was prejudicial because, based on the evidence in that case, there was a
reasonable probability of a different outcome.

"(A) reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. quoting Strickland.
In Maestas, the probation officer testified at the penalty phase of that capital case that
Maestas had a "career criminal" conviction. Maestas, 2012 UT 46,

~

326. Because the

comment was isolated and cured through subsequent testimony, the remark did not render
Mr. Maestas's trial so unfair that the Utah Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to deny a motion for mistrial. Id. The instant matter is not
comparable.
Had counsel interviewed this witness, or at least conferred with the State's
attorney, he could have taken precautionary measures to insure the "cellmate"
information did not come out. Counsel had to be aware that Kary Carter was in prison at
the same time as the Defendant. If he was not, he was derelict. It is safe to presume that
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he was aware of the fact, which means he could have questioned the witness under
circumstances where the witness had been thoroughly warned of his duty to refrain from
divulging the fact that the Defendant's parole was violated or that he was in prison. It is
the sort of precaution which is taken routinely. Yet, even after a near miss with the
witness testifying that he was cared for in prison, prompting defense counsel to request a
bench conference wherein the non-identifying information was noted by the State,
defense counsel sought no cautionary instruction to the witness from either the court or
counsel and delved unnecessarily into areas which insured that the information would
come out. He appears to have negligently opened the door. Then made a decision, rather
than correct or move for a mistrial, to exacerbate the situation. This was not a reasonable
strategy.
It is understood that "Counsel's competence ... is presumed, and the Defendant

must rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney's representation was
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not
sound strategy." Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ii 134, 267 P.3d 232, 269 quoting

Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986).
Defense counsel's willy nilly approach to Kary Carter's testimony regarding the
Defendant's parole violation and being in prison, which was completely unnecessary to
his testimony, was not reasonable.

It is also understood that "a party cannot take

advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
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committing the error," State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (quoting

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)) (internal quotation omitted). In this
instance, however, it is so transparent that defense counsel was bewildered by the
circumstances and simply failed to act as an effective advocate for his client.
Effective assistance is measured by reference to the functioning of the adversary
system in the particular case. It must be truly adversarial. Counsel's actions in this
instance did not provide the requisite "meaningful .adversary testing."

The critical

question is whether counsel's performance was so deficient that the process "lost its
character as a confrontation between adversaries," producing an "actual breakdown in the
adversary process." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654 - 58. The benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.

The introduction of

Defendant's parole violation and prison incarceration could not help but predispose the
jury to presume his guilt in the instant case. This is especially so where the Defendant
did not testify and his record would not have been revealed on cross-examination. It was
a wholly unreasonable strategy on defense counsel's part which led the trial court into
highly prejudicial error.
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POINT III
THE DEFENDANT CONTENDS IT WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL TO FAIL TO REQUEST A MISTRIAL WHEN THE JURY CAME
BACK ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO WHOSE DNA WAS FOUND ON
WHOSE JACKET, AS TESTIFIED TO BY THE DNA EXPERT. THE DNA
EXPERT TESTIFIED ONLY THAT HART'S DNA WAS FOUND ON A JACKET
THAT WAS TESTED WITHOUT STATING THAT IT WAS HART'S JACKET.
WE READ A STIPULATED INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY STATING THE
JACKET WAS HART'S IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE EVIDENCE WAS
ADMITTED, BECAUSE IT WAS GOING TO BE ANOTHER TWO DAYS
BEFORE A WITNESS WOULD TESTIFY THAT THE JACKET WAS HART'S,
AND THEREFORE RENDER THE EVIDENCE INNOCUOUS. THE
INSTRUCTION APPARENTLY WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE JURY,
AND THE COURT WOULD NOT PERMIT CLARIFICATION
DURING DELIBERATIONS.
The sleeve of a jacket was tested by Krista Lungren, Sorenson Forensics DNA
expert. R.3860.

The conclusion was that the left sleeve was found to have defendant's

DNA on it. R.3861. Because it remained unclear who's jacket the sleeve came from, the
parties agreed and a stipulation was read in to the record for the benefit of the jury.
R.3921. The stipulation was as follows: "The parties stipulate to the following: The
sleeve tested which contained Jeremiah Hart's DNA was from Jeremiah Hart's jacket."
Id.
During deliberations the jury submitted a question in this regard. R.4481-4485.
Although defense counsel objected and wished the stipulation read to the jury again,
R.4483, ultimately the following statement was read to the jury: "THE COURT: ... I'm
going to read it into the record. The question, "According to Krista Lundgren, forensic
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report Item 5.0, whose jacket sleeve was tested? Whose DNA was a match for the left
sleeve?"
Then I have the date, 10-2-17. "This issue was the subject of a stipulation read into the
record by counsel. Please rely on your collective memory of the evidence presented by
the Court. Keith Kelly." R.4484. Counsel agreed to this response. R.4485.
The DNA expert testified only that Hart's DNA was found on a jacket that was
tested without stating that it was Hart's jacket. The stipulation read to the jury stated the
jacket was Hart's after the evidence was admitted, because it was going to be another two
days before a witness would testify that the jacket was Hart's, and therefore be highly
confusing to the jury. The stipulation apparently was insufficient for the jury, and the
court would not permit clarification during deliberations. R.4481-4485.
Counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial at this point. "A trial
court's ruling on a motion for mistrial should not be upset unless it clearly appears the
trial court abused its discretion. . . . We presume the trial court exercised proper
discretion unless the record clearly shows to the contrary." State v. Pearson, 818 P.2d
581, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(citations omitted). A mistrial would be appropriate where
there is prejudice which cannot be cured and the Defendant consents to the mistrial or (2)
there is "legal necessity" for the mistrial. State v. Manatau, 2014 UT 7,
739, 744.

45

i! 10, 322 P.3d

POINT IV
THE DEFENDANT CONTENDS THAT IT WAS INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FAILING TO OBJECT WHEN LEAD
DETECTIVE TESTIFIED TO BLOOD SPATTERS AND DROPS FOUND IN
AND ABOUT THE VICTIM'S BODY MATCHED THE DEFENDANT'S DNA,
WHERE THE DETECTIVE WAS NOT NOTICED OR QUALIFIED AS A
BLOOD PATTERN EXPERT.
Detective Spangenburg testified extensively regarding his opinion and conclusions
in relation to the various blood spatters and droppings at the scene where Christian
McDonald lay in the street. R.4166-4173.
marked A, B, C, D, and E. R.4166.

He specifically discussed evidence flags

He testified that the source of blood stain C,

previously linked to the Defendant, R.38733874, being Jeremiah Hart, was stationary, not
moving, for a period of time to leave the blood at the scene. R.4168. He further rendered
his opinion with regard to State's Exhibit 26, a photograph of the scene, R.1997, there's
also bloodstains at A, B, D and E.

Id.

He rendered his opinion that item B was

attributable to Christian McDonald. Id. "It's a different pattern." Id. As to "blood
marks, A, D and E, and others" he opined that those blood droppings could not have
come from Christian McDonald although no DNA testing on A, B or E had been done.
R.4169. He "put those deductions together." Id.
It is the Defendant's contention that it was improper for this witness to so testify
as though he were an expert in the field of blood spatter. Defense counsel was ineffective
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by allowing expert opinions that were improper under Utah R. Evid. 702. The Rule states
as follows:
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b ), a witness who is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve
as the basis for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that
the principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if
the underlying principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or
data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are
generally accepted by the relevant expert community.
Utah R. Evid. 702. In addition to failing to satisfy any of the requirements of Rule 702,
the State gave no prior notice as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13. Expert
testimony generally--Notice requirements. Yet defense counsel failed to object to any of
the testimony, which was prejudicial in its tendency to show that the Defendant lingered
momentarily over the body of Christian McDonald and thus tie him to the shooting death
rather than either Richard McDonald, who admittedly had a gun, R.4075-4076, or Erick
Burwell.
The Defendant therefore contends that counsel's performance was objectively
deficient; and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient performance,
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the Defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Kurr,
2012 UT App 194, ~ 2, 283 P.3d 995, 997.
POINTV
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE COMBINED
ERRORS REQUIRES REVERSAL.

Under the cumulative error doctrine, an appellate court will reverse if the
cumulative effect of all the identified errors, as well as any errors assumed, undermines
the court's confidence that a fair trial was had. State v. Dunn, supra, 1229. "While we
more readily find (cumulative) errors to be harmless when confronted with overwhelming
evidence of the Defendant's guilt ... we are more willing to reverse when a conviction is
based on comparatively thin evidence." State v. King, 2010 UT App 396,

~

35, 248 P.3d

984. The Defendant contends that given the numerous errors, some extremely egregious,
and the "comparatively thin evidence" of the Defendant's guilt, it must be concluded that
confidence in the verdict is undermined and reversal is required.
CONCLUSION

Individually and cumulatively, the foregoing errors require a new trial.
Dated this_ day of December, 2018.

HERSCHEL BULLEN
Attorney for Defendant
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Prosecutor: MATTHEW J HANSEN
NATHAN J EVERSHED
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The defendant is in the custody of the Department of Corrections Utah State Prison Draper
Defendant's Attorney(s): R SHANE JOHNSON
STACI A VISSER
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 4, 1972
Sheriff Office#: 170498
Audio
Tape Number:

S35

Tape Count: 332.

CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 10/03/2017 Guilty

2. OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 10/03/2017 Guilty

3. POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 10/03/2017 Guilty

HEARING
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Case No: 151905395 Date:

Jan 18, 2018

This matter is before the Court as sentencing. The parties are present as previously
listed.
336- The State motions for a phone conference so that the victim's sister may be
present. There are no objections by the defense. The Court grants motion.
338- Court is in recess.
344- Court is back in session. A telephone conference is set.
There are corrections to the presentence report. Counsel stipulate to the corrections
of the presentence report.
On page 1, the Court orders that never be stricken under the marital status.
On page 1, the Court orders that the prosecuting attorney and defense attorneys be
corrected on this report. Vincent B Meister and John K West is stricken from page 1.
Matthew J Hansen and Nathan J Evershed are entered as the prosecuting attorneys. Shane
R Johnson and Staci A Visser are entered as the defense attorneys.
On page 1, the Court orders that the codefendant Eric Burwell be entered under
codefendants.
On page 4 under subpart B Offense Summary in paragraph 2, the Court strikes the
statement the defendant's vehicle. The Court enters Eric Burwell's vehicle in place of
the stricken statement.
On page 4 under subpart B Offense Summary in paragraph 3, the Court strikes the
defendant in the first sentence and inputs Eric Burwell name.
On page 4 under subpart B Offense Summary in paragraph 4, the Court strikes the
statement and took the backpack and the drugs with him.
On page 4 under subpart B Offense Summary in paragraph 7, the Court strikes the last
sentence.

351- The State addresses the Court.
403- The State seeks life in prison without the possibility of parole.
418- The defense addresses the Court.
SENTENCE PRISON
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Case No: 151905395 Date:

Jan 18, 2018

Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than twenty five years and
which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one
year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff:

The defendant is remanded to your custody for

transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
This case is to be served consecutive to prior commitments. The F2 Obstructions Justice
is to be consecutive to Fl Aggravated Murder. The F2 Possession of a DANG WEAP by
Restricted is to be consecutive to the other charges.Restitution is to remain open.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
BULLET
BULLFROG
JEREMIAH HEART

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

Case No: 151905395 Date:

Jan 18, 2018
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 151905395 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

PRISON udc-records@utah.gov
01/18/2018

/s/ SHAYLEE BROCIOUS

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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AddendumB

1

Q.

2

bullet?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And who did it belong to?

5

A.

Jeremiah Hart.

6

Q.

We're going to now move to where Christian McDonald's

Okay.

And then was there DNA then found on that

7

body lay, and we'll talk a little bit about blood splatter.

8

Here, with his blood spatter -- first of all, is there an

9

indication as to where Christian McDonald was located on

10

State's Exhibit 26?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Can you just show the outline of that?

13

yellow?

14

A.

It is.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And, again, in previous -- with previous witnesses,

Is that in

Is there an H at the top?

18

we see these evidence flags marked A, B, C, D, and E and

19

continuing down the alphabet?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

And again, what are those indications of?

22

A.

Blood.

23

Q.

Okay.

24
25

Were swabs taken of certain evidence markers

or certain bloodstains?

A.

Yes.

So there was 56 total markers depicting blood
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1

at the scene, and then 11 swabs were taken at that -- at that

2

various blood patterns.

3

4

Q.

Okay.

Specifically when it comes to C -- well, why

don't we just republish 26 and just show us where C is located.
Right there?

5

Okay.

So with State's Exhibit C, I'll

6

now publish State's Exhibit 30.

7

that -- now that we know about C that we didn't know before; is

8

that correct?

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

Through this trial.

11

Okay.

A couple of things

First of all, was there DNA

testing on the swab of C?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Was there, in fact -- let me back up one step, I

14

guess.

Was there a swab taken of this blood marked C?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And then was that swab submitted to Sorenson

17

Forensics for DNA testing?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Was that compared to Jeremiah Hart?

20

A.

It was.

21

Q.

And what was

22

A.

It came back as his blood.

23

Q.

And then we had Jennifer Montero here.

24

A.

Correct.

25

Q.

And what was her opinion as to what as -- as it

what was the conclusion?
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1

2

happens with C, with bloodstain C?
A.

I believe she stated the blood source would have had

3

to have been stationary for a period of time to leave that

4

pattern.

5

6
7
8

Q.

So from that, putting that together, what do we know

from this exhibit?
A.

That the source, being Jeremiah Hart, was stationary

for a period of time to leave the blood at the scene.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

Correct.

11

Q.

Going back to State's Exhibit 26, there's also

12

Stationary meaning not moving?

bloodstains at A, B, D and E; is that correct?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

With B, is that a different kind of a

15

bloodstain that we see there than we see compared to the

16

others?

17

A.

That's a different pattern, yes.

18

Q.

Okay.

Based off of what you know as the case

19

manager, have you reached a conclusion as to what -- what that

20

B has to be attributed to?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

What is that?

23

A.

I believe it's Christian McDonald's blood.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

It's a different pattern.

And why do you say that?
It's in the approximate
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1

location which he was laying.

2

the bullet went through his chest and out his back.

3

upon an evidence inspection of his clothing, there was blood on

4

the front of his shirt.

5

But there was also blood on the back, saturating his gray

6

hoodie that he was wearing.
Okay.

Previous testimony states that
And based

He was laying face up in the street.

We have, other than blood marks, A, D and E

7

Q.

8

and others.

9

manager in this case, that those blood drops could have been

10

Is there any indication to you, as the case

Christian McDonald's?

11

A.

I don't believe so.

12

Q.

Why do you say that?

13

A.

They are -- they are a consistent pattern.

And based

14

upon Christian's wounds, his clothing would have captured the

15

majority of his blood.

16

Butler, there was not a lot of blood coming from his chest

17

wound, and he had just a small amount of blood coming from his

18

mouth.

And based upon testimony from Dr.

19

Q.

Okay.

No DNA testing on A, B or E; is that correct?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

Correct.

23

Q.

We're going to zoom out again, at this house, State's

24

Exhibit 34.

25

A.

But you put those deductions together?

Are we seeing more of the blood trail?

Yes.
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

All right.

4

And do we see it from A until I?

And when we continue down to State's

Exhibit 36 -- and what are we seeing here?

5

A.

It's more of the blood trail, H through K.

6

Q.

And now we're going to K.

On K, we've seen this

7

exhibit before, but now do we know a couple more things about

8

K?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Specifically, DNA.

11

DNA testing?

12

A.

What do we know about K with the

It was swabbed at the scene.

Those swabs were

13

submitted to Sorenson Forensics for analysis.

14

came back to Jeremiah Hart.

15
16
17
18

Q.

Okay.

And then also, according to Jennifer Montero,

what did she indicate on K?
A.

The source of that blood, being Jeremiah Hart, was

moving in the westerly direction.
Is there some kind of directionality on K?

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Yes, there is.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A full profile

Was there a jacket that was obtained that the

defendant was wearing that evening?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Later, was that jacket placed into evidence with the

25

Salt Lake City Police Department?
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1

2

A.

Yes.

It was approximately on the 24th or the 25th,

so the same day, or into the early morning hours of the 25th.

3

Q.

Was it located in the hospital?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

So that -- was that then turned over to the Salt Lake

6
7

City Police Department and placed into an evidence storage bag?
A.

I don't know if it was a secured drawing locker

8

initially or the evidence bag.

9

of it.

10
11

Q.

Just depending on the condition

Eventually it did end up in the evidence room in Salt

Lake City Police Department?

12

A.

It did, yes.

13

Q.

And were photographs taken of that jacket?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

I'm going to show you what's been marked as State's

16

's Exhibit 159 and 160.

17

Defense counsel.

I have previously shown these to

Do you recognize these exhibits?

18

19

A.

I

do.

20

Q.

And what -- what are they?

21

A.

It's a black, red, white FUBU-style zip-up jacket.

22

Q.

Are those photographs fair and accurate depictions as

23

to what Jeremiah Hart's jacket looked like on this provided

24

evidence?

25

A.

Yes.
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Q.

1
2

And is this the same jacket that was taken at the

hospital?

3

Yes.

A.

4
5

MR. EVERSHED:

State's Exhibit 159 and 160 into evidence.

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

THE COURT:

8

No objection.
State's Exhibit 159 and 160 are admitted.

(State's Exhibit Nos.

159 & 160 were received into evidence.)

MR. EVERSHED:

9

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. EVERSHED:

12
13

Q.

A.

You may.
Thank you.

(BY MR. EVERSHED)

State's Exhibit 159, what do we see

Once again it's the black FUBU jacket that Jeremiah

Hart was wearing.

16
17

Permission to publish.

in that?

14
15

Your Honor, the State would offer

Q.

And why don't we just pause here.

There's some

earlier testimony about M-Vac, on the sleeves.

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Did that happen on this jacket?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

An M-Vac is essentially a forensic vacuum, if you

So what's an M-Vac?

23

will.

If somebody touches my sleeve, they're theoretically

24

going to leave skin cells.

25

vacuum that area that somebody touched, and with special

So the crime lab technician will
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1

filters that allegedly capture that DNA left by that individual

2

that touched.

3

Q.

And so did that happen in this case?

4

A.

It did, yes.

Q.

Okay.

5
6

7

On both sleeves, the right and the

left.
And then later we heard DNA testimony about

the results of that?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

sleeve?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

But not on the other?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

And then finally when it comes to this, State's

15
16
17
18

19

Was it just Jeremiah Hart's DNA found on one

Exhibit 160, what do we see here?

A.

It's just a -- the interior label or tag of that same

zip-up jacket with two extra large size, double X.
Q.

All right.

So this is the size of the jacket that

you saw in this exhibit?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

In this case, was there a search of --

22
23

MR. EVERS.BED:

In case I didn't formally admit those,

I'd like to admit those.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. EVERS.BED:

59 and 60 were admitted.
Okay.
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AddendumC

§ 76-5-202. Aggravated murder, UT ST§ 76-5-202

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-202
§ 76-5-202. Aggravated murder

Effective: [See Text Amendments] to June 30, 2019
Currentness
<Section effective until July 1, 2019. See, also, section 76-5-202 effective July 1, 2019.>

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another
under any of the following circumstances:

(a) the homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or other correctional institution;

(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which
two or more persons were killed, or during which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the
victim who was killed;

(c) the actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim and the actor;

(d) the homicide was committed incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the
actor committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child. object rape, object rape
of a child, forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, child abuse as defined in Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), or aggravated sexual assault. aggravated arson,
arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, or child kidnapping;

(e) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct. or criminal episode during which the
actor committed the crime of abuse or desecration of a dead human body as defined in Subsection 76-9· 704(2)(e);

(f) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the defendant or another by a

peace ot1icer acting under color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendant's or another's escape
from lawful custody;

(g) the homicide was committed for pecuuiary gain;

W~S1li~.W
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(h) the defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person to commit the homicide pursuant to an
agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide;

(i) the actor previously committed or was convicted of:

(i) aggravated murder under this section;

(ii) attempted aggravated murder under this section;

(iii) murder, Section 76-5-203;

(iv) attempted murder, Section 76-5-203; or

(v) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this state would be a violation of a crime
listed in this Subsection (l)(i);

(j) the actor was previously convicted of:

(i) aggravated assault, Subsection 76-5-103(2);

(ii) mayhem, Section 76-5-105;

(iii) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301;

(iv) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.l;

(v) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302;

(vi) rape, Section 76-5-402;

(vii) rape ofa child, Section 76-5-402.1:

(viii) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2;

(ix) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3;

·--"'"'"""""""""'
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(x) forcible sodomy, Section 76-5-403;

(xi) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.l;

(xii) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.l;

(xiii) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405;

(xiv) aggravated arson, Section 76-6-103;

(xv) aggravated burglary, Section 76-6-203;

(xvi) aggravated robbery, Section 76-6-302;

(xvii) felony discharge ofa firearm, Section 76-10-508.1; or

(xviii) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this state would be a violation of a crime
listed in this Subsection (l)(j);

(k) the homicide was committed for the purpose of:

(i) preventing a witness from testifying;

(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation;

(iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or participating in any legal proceedings or official
investigation; or

(iv) disrupting or hindering any lawful governmental function or enforcement oflaws:

(1) the victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a candidate for public office, and the homicide
is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position, act, capacity, or candidacy;

(m) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer, executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer,
prison official, firefighter, judge or other court official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer. and the victim is
either on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position, and the actor knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the victim holds or has held that oificial position:

WESTLAW © ~'.018 Thomson Reu!ers. No claim to original U.S. Govornrrionl V\!orks.
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(n) the homicide was committed:

(i) by means of a destructive device, bomb, explosive, incendiary device, or similar device which was planted, hidden,
or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or was mailed or delivered;

(ii) by means ofany weapon of mass destruction as defined in Section 76-10-401; or

(iii) to target a law enforcement officer as defined in Section 76-5-210;

(o) the homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assuming control of any aircraft, train, or other public
conveyance by use of threats or force with intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the release of the public
conveyance or any passenger, crew member, or any other person aboard, or to direct the route or movement of the
public conveyance or otherwise exert control over the public conveyance;

(p) the homicide was committed by means of the administration of a poison or of any lethal substance or of any
substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or quantity;

(q) the victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield, hostage, or for ransom;

(r) the homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of
which must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before
death;

(s) the actor dismembers, mutilates, or disfigures the victim's body, whether before or after death, in a manner
demonstrating the actor's depravity of mind; or

(t) the victim, at the time of the death of the victim:

(i) was younger than 14 years of age; and

(ii) was not an unborn child.

(2) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor, with reckless indifference to human life, causes the
death of another incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor is a major
participant in the commission or attempted commission of:

(a) child abuse, Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a);
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(b) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.l;

(c) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402. l;

(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3;

(e) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; or

(t) sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1.

(3)(a) Ifa notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been filed, aggravated murder is a capital felony.

(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has not been filed, aggravated murder is a noncapital first degree
felony punishable as provided in Section 76-3-207.7.

(c)(i) Within 60 days after arraignment of the defendant, the prosecutor may file notice of intent to seek the death
penalty. The notice shall be served on the defendant or defense counsel and filed with the court.

(ii) Notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be served and filed more than 60 days after the arraignment upon
written stipulation of the parties or upon a finding by the court of good cause.

(d) Without the consent of the prosecutor, the court may not accept a plea of guilty to noncapital first degree felony
aggravated murder during the period in which the prosecutor may file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty
under Subsection (3)(c)(i).

(e) If the defendant was younger than 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed, aggravated murder is a
noncapital first degree felony punishable as provided in Section 76-3-207.7.

(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated murder or attempted aggravated murder that the defendant
caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another under a reasonable belief that the circumstances
provided a legal justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable
under the existing circumstances.

(b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person under the then existing circumstances.

(c) This affinnative defense reduces charges only as follows:

WESTlAW @ L'.018 Thomson Reuters. No dairn to original U.S. Govemrm3nt Works.
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(i) aggravated murder to murder; and

(ii) attempted aggravated murder to attempted murder.

(5)(a) Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes a separate offense does not merge
with the crime of aggravated murder.

(b) A person who is convicted of aggravated murder, based on an aggravating circumstance described in Subsection
(1) or (2) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and punished for, the separate offense.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-201; Laws 1975, c. 53, § l; Laws 1977, c. 83, § l; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 12; Laws 1983, c. 93, § 1;
Laws 1984, c. 18, § 5; Laws 1985, c. 16, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 10, § 8; Laws 1994, c. 149, § 1: Laws 1996, c. 137, § 3, eff. April
29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 11, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 90, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2000, c. 125, § 2, eff. May
1, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 9, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 166, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2005. c. 143, § l_, eff.
May 2, 2005; Laws 2006, c. 191, § 1, eff. May 1. 2006; Laws 2007, c. 275, § 3, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 340, § 1,
eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 345, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 12, § 2. eff. Feb. 26, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 157,
§ 2, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2009, c. 206, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 13. § 2. eff. March 8, 2010; Laws 2010, c.
373, § 2, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2013, c. 81, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2017, c. 454, § 2, eff. May 9, 2017.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-202, UT ST§ 76-5-202
Current with the 2018 Second Special Session.
End of Documenl
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-306
§ 76-8-306. Obstruction of justice in criminal investigations or proceedings--Elements--Penalties--Exceptions

Currentness
(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation,

apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal
offense:

(a) provides any person with a weapon;

(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception. any person from pe1forming any act that might aid in the discovery,
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person;

(c) alters, destroys, conceals. or removes any item or other thing:

(d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false;

(e) harbors or conceals a person;

(t) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension;

(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension;

(h) warns any person of an order authorizing the interception of wire communications or of a pending application for
an order authorizing the interception of wire communications;

(i) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, after a judge or magistrate has ordered
the actor to provide the information; or

(j) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct constituting an offense, or any other material
aspect of the investigation.
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(2)(a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means conduct that would be punishable as
a crime and is separate from a violation of this section, and includes:

(i) any violation of a ctiminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political subdivisions, any other state, or any
district, possession, or territory of the United States: and

(ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a ctime if committed by an adult.

(b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any district, possession, or territory of the
United States, is a:

(i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life imprisonment without parole;

(ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life imprisonment with parole or a maximum term of
imprisonment exceeding 15 years;

(iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years;

(iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period exceeding one year; and

(v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period of one year or less.

(3) Obstruction of justice is:

(a) a second degree felony ifthe conduct which constitutes an offense would be a capital felony or first degree felony;

(b) a third degree felony if:

(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third degree felony and the actor violates Subsection
(l)(b), (c), (d), (e), or (f);

(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other than a capital or first degree felony and the
actor violates Subsection (l)(a);

(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of law; or

(iv) a violation of Subsection (l)(h); or

V\!ESilAW © 2018 Thomson R.euters. No cla!rn to original tLS, Government VVorks,
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(c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not enumerated under Subsection (3)(a) or (b).

(4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct constituting an offense.

( 5) Subsection (1 )(e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is governed by Section 62A-7-402.

(6) Subsection (l)(b) does not apply to:

(a) tampering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508.5;

(b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, which is
governed by Section 76-8-316;

(c) tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe, which is governed by Section 76-8-508;

(d) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant, which is governed by Section 76-8-508.3; or

(e) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed by Section 76-8-509.

(7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree felony if the actor harbors or conceals
an offender who has escaped from official custody as defined in Section 76-8-309.

Credits
Laws 2001, c. 209, § 10, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 307, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 179, § l; Laws 2004,
c. 140, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2004, c. 240, § 3, eff. March 22, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 13, § 27, eff. March 1, 2005; Laws
2009, c. 213, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-306, UT ST§ 76-8-306
Current with the 2018 Second Special Session.
.End of Docmmmt
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-10-503
§ 76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and
ownership of dangerous weapons by certain persons--Exceptions

Currentness
(1) For purposes of this section:

(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who:

(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5;

(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony;

(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101:

(iv) within the last 10 years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an adult would
have been a violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5;

(v) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or

(vi) is on probation for a conviction of possessing:

(A) a substance classified in Section 58-37-4 as a Schedule l or II controlled substance;

(B) a controlled substance analog; or

(C) a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2.

(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who:

(i) has been convicted of any felony;
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(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if committed by an adult would
have been a felony;

(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;

(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule
I or II controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;

(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense;

(vi) has been folmd mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony offense;

(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), 1 or has been committed to a mental institution;

(viii) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces;

(ix) has renounced the individual's citizenship after having been a citizen of the United States;

(x) is a respondent or defendant subject to a protective order or child protective order that is issued after a hearing
for which the respondent or defendant received actual notice and at which the respondent or defendant has an
opportunity to participate, that restrains the respondent or defendant from harassing, stalking, threatening, or
engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner, as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921, or a child of the
intimate partner. in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the intimate partner or child of the intimate partner, and that:

(A) includes a finding that the respondent or defendant represents a credible threat to the physical safety of an
individual who meets the definition of an intimate partner in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921 or the child of the individual; or

(B) explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force that would reasonably be
expected to cause bodily harm against an intimate partner or the child of an intimate partner; or

(xi) has been convicted of the commission or attempted commission of assault under Section 76-5-102 or aggravated
assault under Section 76-5-103 against a current or former spouse, parent, guardian, individual with whom the
restricted person shares a child in common, individual who is cohabitating or has cohabitated with the restricted
person as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or against an individual similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian
of the restricted person.

(c) As used in this section, a conviction of a felony or adjudication of delinquency for an offense which would be a
felony if committed by an adult does not include:
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(i) a conviction or adjudication of delinquency for an offense pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices,
restraint of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices not involving theft or
fraud; or

(ii) a conviction or adjudication of delinquency which, according to the law of the jurisdiction in which it occurred,
has been expunged. set aside, reduced to a misdemeanor by court order, pardoned or regarding which the person's
civil rights have been restored unless the pardon, reduction, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly
provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

(d) It is the burden of the defendant in a criminal case to provide evidence that a conviction or adjudication of
delinquency is subject to an exception provided in Subsection (l)(c), after which it is the burden of the state to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the conviction or adjudication of delinquency is not subject to that exception.

(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, consents, offers, or arranges to purchase,
transfer, possess, use, or have under the person's custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases,
transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or control:

(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or

(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony.

(3) A Category II restricted person who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under
the person's custody or control:

(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or

(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same time.

(5) Ifa higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in another section for one who purchases, transfers,
possesses, uses, or has under this custody or control any dangerous weapon, the penalties of that section control.

(6) It is an affirmative defense to a charge based on the definition in Subsection (l)(b)(iv) that the person was:

(a) in possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner for use of a member of the
person's household or for administration to an animal owned by the person or a member of the person's household; or

WiSTlAW' @2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Governrnent Works,
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(b) otherwise authorized by law to possess the substance.

(7)(a) It is an affirmative defense to transferring a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a person restricted under
Subsection (2) or (3) that the firearm or dangerous weapon:

(i) was possessed by the person or was under the person's custody or control before the person became a restricted
person;

(ii) was not used in or possessed during the commission of a crime or subject to disposition under Section 24-3-103;

(iii) is not being held as evidence by a court or law enforcement agency;

(iv) was transferred to a person not legally prohibited from possessing the weapon; and

(v) unless a different time is ordered by the court, was transferred within 10 days of the person becoming a restricted
person.

(b) Subsection (7)(a) is not a defense to the use, purchase, or possession on the person of a firearm or other dangerous
weapon by a restricted person.

(8)(a) A person may not sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any firearm or dangerous weapon to any person, knowing
that the recipient is a person described in Subsection (l)(a) or (b).

(b) A person who violates Subsection (8)(a) when the recipient is:

(i) a person described in Subsection (l)(a) and the transaction involves a firearm, is guilty of a second degree felony;

(ii) a person.described in Subsection (l)(a) and the transaction involves any dangerous weapon other than a firearm,
and the transferor has knowledge that the recipient intends to use the weapon for any unlawful purpose, is guilty
of a third degree felony;

(iii) a person described in Subsection (l)(b) and the transaction involves a firearm, is guilty of a third degree felony; or

(iv) a person described in Subsection ( 1)(b) and the transaction involves any dangerous weapon other than a firearm,
and the transferor has knowledge that the recipient intends to use the weapon for any unlawful purpose, is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.
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(9)(a) A person may not knowingly solicit, persuade, encourage or entice a dealer or other person to sell, transfer or
otherwise dispose of a firearm or dangerous weapon under circumstances which the person knows would be a violation
of the law.

(b) A person may not provide to a dealer or other person any information that the person knows to be materially false
information with intent to deceive the dealer or other person about the legality of a sale, transfer or other disposition
of a firearm or dangerous weapon.

(c) "Materially false information" means information that portrays an illegal transaction as legal or a legal transaction
as illegal.

(d) A person who violates this Subsection (9) is guilty of:

(i) a third degree felony if the transaction involved a firearm; or

(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the transaction involved a dangerous weapon other than a firearm.

Credits
Laws 2000, c. 303, § 5, eff. May 1, 2000: Laws 2000, c. 90, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 203, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003;
Laws 2003, c. 235, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2012, c. 317, § 2, eff. May 8, 2012: Laws 2014, c. 299, § 1, eff. May 13,
2014: Laws 2014, c. 428, § 2, eff. May 13, 2014; Laws 2015. c. 412. § 203. eff. May 12, 2015; Laws 2015, 1st Sp. Sess., c.
1, § 2, eff. Aug. 20, 2015; Laws 2017, c. 288, § 1, eff. May 9, 2017.

Footnotes
1
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 et seq.
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-10-503, UT ST§ 76-10-503
Current with the 2018 Second Special Session.
End. nf Docmmml
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RULE 403. EXCLUDING RELEVANT EVIDENCE FOR.. ., UT R REV Rule 403

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403

RULE 403. EXCLUDING RELEVANT EVIDENCE FOR PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, WASTE OF TIME, OR OTHER REASONS
Currentness

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more
of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury. undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.

Credits
[Amended effective December 1, 2011.]

Rules of Evid., Rule 403, UT R REV Rule 403
Current with amendments received through September 1, 2018
Enrl nf Document
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RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS, UT R REV Rule 702

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702

RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
Currentness
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b). a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, sl\ill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert testimony only if there is a
threshold showing that the principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony

(1) are reliable,

(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and

(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.

(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying principles or methods, including the
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the
relevant expert community.

<::.-e1UQ>
[Anwnded effective November l, 2007; Dece1n1Jer l, 2011.]

Rules ofBvi<i., Rule 702, UT R REV Rule 702
Current with amendments received through September 1, 2018
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-17-13
§ 77-17-13. Expert testimony generally--Notice requirements

Currentness
(1 )(a) Tfthe prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding
a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. the party intending to call the
expert shalJ give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or 10 days
before the hearing.

(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and one of the following:

(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or

(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice
to prepare to meet the testimony; and

(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party on reasonable notice.

(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee charged by the expert for the consultation.

(2) ff an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the results of any tests or other specialized data,
the party intending to call the witness shall provide to the opposing party the information upon request.

(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the information concerning the expert's proposed
testimony, the party receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates
calling to rebut the expert's testimony. including the information required under Subsection (l)(b).

(4)(a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially c:omply with the requirements of this section, the opposing
party shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to
allow preparation to meet the testimony.

(b) Jf the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the part of any party or
attorney, the court ~hall impose appropriate sanctions. The remedy of <Jxclusion of the expert's testimony will only
apply if the court finds that a party deliberately violated the provisions of this section.

WESilAW @ 2018 Thomson Heuters. No claim to original U.S. Government VVorks.
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(5)(a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expe11 at a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's
proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary hearing.

(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing shall provide the opposing party with
a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may
be called as an expert witness.

(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so
long as the opposing party is on reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as a witness
at triaL and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party upon reasonable notice.

Credits

Laws 1994, c. 139, § 3; Laws 1999, c. 43, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003.
Chapters 1 to 21 appear in this volume.

U.C.A.1953§77-17-13, UTST§77-17-13
Current with the 2018 Second Special Session.
End of Uocumenl
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AddendumD

1

THE BAILIFF:

2

(Jury Excused.)

3

THE COURT:

4

issues to clarify.

5

begin with?

Remain seated for the jury.

Okay.

There are some

Do you want to do them at a sidebar to

Why don't you come to the sidebar for a second.

6

(Bench Conference.)

7

THE COURT:

8

The jury has left.

In other words, I don't want to make the

argument in front of the witness.
So let's -- we really have, I guess, two

MR. HANSEN:

9
10

options.

One is that he just did a normal shot with a 9mm that

11

was not related.
Here is the problem.

MR. JOHNSON:

12

What they're

13

trying to show is that the round found at the scene was -- has

14

a very specific characteristic [inaudible] but the problem is:

15

Their sample test fire is from a gun taken from Jeremiah Hart a

16

month later.

17

MR. HANSEN:

18

THE COURT:

I guess what I'm getting at is -Well, I want to be clear I understand

19

nobody is agreeing that there will be reference to a gun being

20

taken from the defendant a month later?
MR. EVERSHED:

21

Absolutely.

He just said he was given

22

two guns in this case and now he's talking about I test fired

23

it against this one.

24

him.

25

MR. HANSEN:

It's -- it is the gun that was taken from

I don't think he's said that he was

DEREK MEARS - Direct by MR. HANSEN
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1

given two guns in this case.

2

testimony [inaudible].

3

MR. JOHNSON:

4

MS. VISSER:

5

I don't think that was his

But I guess what I'm trying to -For the purposes for the record,

I think

maybe we should put this on the record.

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. VISSER:

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. VISSER:

Okay.

10

MR. HANSEN:

So I guess what I'm trying to say is, is

Is it on the record.
Oh, okay.
It's being recorded.
Great.

11

that if he does not say that that gun was ever taken from the

12

defendant, it's just 9mm he used as a reference sample, it

13

seems to me we're -- you're not --

14

MR. JOHNSON:

He's already testified he's been given

15

two guns and then he started testifying about test firing one

16

of the one guns that he was given and then he's about to

17

testify that this doesn't match this.

18

THE COURT:

Can we solve it by saying the second gun

19

that he was given in the case is a 9rnm gun that's just an

20

example of a glock?

21

MR. EVERSHED:

22

MR. HANSEN:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. JOHNSON:

25

Yes.
A 9rnm test gun.

Do you want to call it a 9rnm, a glock?
I mean,

I guess we could call it a

comparison gun.

DEREK MEARS - Direct by MR. HANSEN

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. JOHNSON:

3

A comparison gun.
Yeah.

I don't want this us -- all to

be suborning perjury here.

4

MR. EVERSHED:

5

don't think anything [inaudible].

THE COURT:

6

Well,

I think if all parties agree,

Well, the issue is:

He used it as a test

7

reference by -- it could have been a glock that he went down

8

and purchased at the store.

9

was handed to him in the case.

MR. HANSEN:

10

I

It could have been a glock that

The problem is it's not a glock.

So it

11

actually excludes the gun that was taken from Mr. Hart a month

12

later.

13
14

THE COURT:

So what kind of -- so the bullet was from

a 9mm what?

15

MR. EVERSHED:

16

MS. VISSER:

17

MR. EVERSHED:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

Glock.
Glock.
[inaudible].

The test gun was not a glock.
It was Cal-Tech, a different type of

9mm does not leave the characteristics.

21

THE COURT:

22

relevant at all in this case?

23

MR. HANSEN:

So why is -- why is the comparison

All the relevance is pictures to show

24

that -- what a glock does to a bullet.

So it just shows the

25

difference between two different types of guns.
DEREK MEARS - Direct by MR. HANSEN
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MR. EVERSHED:

1

Because that's [inaudible] magazine is

2

a glock magazine.

3

9mm bullet is found.

4

imprint on it that looks consistent with a glock as compared to

5

something that's not a glock, the jury can see that.

6

that -- that's how he made the conclusions that it's in fact

7

not a glock.

8
9

It's a 9mm shell casing that's found.

No

And so to have a casing that has an

Oh,

Nothing so far has come out that there has been a
prior case, that any other gun or any other bullet or any other

10

casing has been linked to the defendant.

11

proffered for comparison purposes.

It's -- it was just

[inaudible] .

12

MS. VISSER:

13

MR. EVERSHED:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. EVERSHED:

Okay.

16

THE COURT:

a 104 hearing.

Yeah.

Is he excused [inaudible].

Well, no, because we may need to do --

So let's just be clear

17

then:

The picture itself is a comparison -- is this

18

expert

is this expert in a position to testify that the

19

bullet

I think it was on Item 43, which is

20

exhibit -- State's Exhibit 122, what is your offer of proof on

21

that?

22

MR. HANSEN:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

He is going to -- he's going to testify.
Which one was the -- the shell cartridge

found on the scene?
MR. HANSEN:

This one.

DEREK MEARS - Direct by MR. HANSEN
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. EVERSHED:

3

THE COURT:

4

And he has an opinion?
Yes.

That's -- he has an opinion that just

looking at that alone he knows what kind of firearm --

5

MR. EVERSHED:

Yes.

6

THE COURT:

shot it?

7

MR. HANSEN:

8

MR. EVERSHED:

9

THE COURT:

MR. JOHNSON:

13

MR. EVERSHED:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

But this -[inaudible] firing pin.

-- this is a test fire from a gun

received into evidence on this case.

MR. EVERSHED:

16
17

Compared to that which is not

consistent with a glock.

12

15

Yes, what it's consistent with.

Or it's consistent with.

MR. EVERSHED:

10
11

What it's consistent with.

Right.

And as long as the jury

doesn't know about it, there is no prejudice to anybody.

THE COURT:

18

But the point is:

This was a good reason

19

to stop the examination because I want to make clear you risk a

20

mistrial.

21

MR. EVERSHED:

22

THE COURT:

23

the comparison gun,

Correct.

If there is any evidence that this gun,
I will just call it that --

24

MR. EVERSHED:

25

THE COURT:

Yes.

The comparison gun was obtained from the

DEREK MEARS - Direct by MR. HANSEN
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1

defendant because --

2

MR. EVERSHED:

3

MR. JOHNSON:

Absolutely.
And at this point now we have the

4

problem of a gun coming into evidence that we're never going to

5

talk about.

Now the jury knows two guns came into evidence --

THE COURT:

6

But clarification though is:

If the --

7

if the testimony on 122 is that the bullet recovered from the

8

scene was fired from the glock and the comparison gun was not a

9

glock

10

MR. JOHNSON:

11

THE COURT:

12

Sure.
-- then there is no inference that it was

a glock held by the defendant, correct?

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14

MS. VISSER:

15

MR. JOHNSON:

16

MR. EVERSHED:

17

Why

Why would we be looking?
Well, it

It just --

it demonstrates and it

It demonstrates with evidence from this

MR. JOHNSON:

case -- from another case.
MR. EVERSHED:

20
21

Yeah.

adds to

18

19

Why do we have a comparison gun?

Where is the prejudice if we don't

know what [inaudible].
THE COURT:

22

Well, hold on.

Hold on.

You're arguing

23

to me.

The point -- the point I understand is the offer of

24

proof is:

25

could have covered up and not used the other -- other shell

This is to show that it's fired from a glock.

DEREK MEARS - Direct by MR. HANSEN
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1

comparison and said this was -- well, you've already shown it

2

to the jury.

3

So he could have testified this is consistent with

4

firing from a glock and then he'll just say there was a

5

comparison -- there was another 9mm gun that was not a glock

6

that he received from the police department as .a comparison,

7

and this shows how a different kind of 9mm imprints the shell

8

when it's fired.

9

different ways of having an impression on the primer or the

10

This is -- this is a

firing pin that shoots off the bullet.

11

MR. EVERSHED:

12

THE COURT:

13

14

these are two

Yes.

Now is that -- does that deal with that

issue?

MR. JOHNSON:

15

this point.

16

of this case.

I think the cat is out of the bag at

We're talking about he's seen two guns as a part
And

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

THE COURT:

But let's be clear.
And now
There has been no information that was a

20

gun received from the defendant.

21

MR. JOHNSON:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. EVERSHED:

There has been none.
Has been none?
There has been none.
So we want to keep it that way.
Correct.
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THE COURT:

1

So the point though is:

I'm not trying

2

to -- so I want to be clear:

3

testimony that this impression was made by a gun that had any

4

connection to the defendant.

5

MR. EVERSHED:

6

THE COURT:

My ruling is there is to be no

Absolutely.

And we ought to

if there is a

7

stipulation to refer to the gun as being a comparison gun only,

8

he received a comparison gun from the police department to

9

illustrate the difference between a glock and a different kind

10

of gun.

11

MR. EVERSHED:

12

THE COURT:

13

Okay.

Does that resolve the issue or not?

You

look like you're a little troubled by it.
MR. JOHNSON:

14

I'm really troubled because it's --

15

it's now conspicuous to the jury:

16

about -- he said there are two guns and now they're going to

17

want to know what's this other gun?

18

gun.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. JOHNSON:

Why -- why are we worried

Because this case has one

Well and doesn't this resolve it, 122?
If this -- if we -- if we have him

21

actually affirmatively state, "I was provided this for the sole

22

purpose of showing" --

23
24
25

MR. HANSEN:

I'm going to tell him he had the

comparison gun -MR. JOHNSON:

characteristics
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1
2

MR. HANSEN:

Some comparison guns available to him

and that's what that is.

3

MR. JOHNSON:

4

THE COURT:

It's not affiliated with the case.
Okay.

Can we stipulate that the second gun was

5

used -- was a comparison gun the witness received.

6

resolve the issue?

7
8

Does that

I mean, there is absolutely no connection of that gun
to the defendant at this point, and there is not to be.
MR. EVERSHED:

9

MR. JOHNSON:

10

Nor did we ever intend to be.
Well, I don't know why you're using

11

actual evidence instead of using something from Google to show

12

that comparison.

13

MR. EVERSHED:

14

demonstrate.

15

demonstrates it.

It's something that he created.

It just

It's just a demonstrative -- it really is.

THE COURT:

16

Because it just -- it just

So let's be clear.

The stipulation is

17

that he received another 9mm that has no connection to this

18

case.

And when I say "no connection to the case," that's true.

19

MR. EVERSHED:

20

THE COURT:

It's true.

Because the fact that it came from the

21

defendant in this case or from anybody else is really not

22

relevant.

23

that there is a comparison gun.

24

comparison gun used and to demonstrate how a different

25

manufacturer's firearm, a 9mm creates a different impression on

So I will just direct you to state on the record
We stipulate there is a
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1

a shell.

2
3

that.

4

MR. HANSEN:

5

THE COURT:

6

On that end, feel free to lead in into

MR. JOHNSON:

Yeah.
Okay.

MR. EVERSHED:

8

THE COURT:

10

In fact --

And that's -- so does that resolve

this issue?

7

9

Yeah.

Yes.

Assuming

you do that.

And I will

direct you to lead the witness on that issue to make clear it's
a comparison firearm that has no connection to this case.

11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

THE COURT:

That's fine.
Both sides agree.

Okay.

What's the

13

other issue we need to deal with?

14

this?

15

attorneys, not to give suggestions to the witness.

The reason I had a side bar is I wanted it to be among

16

MR. EVERSHED:

17

THE COURT:

18

Okay.

Can we deal with the other one in open

court?

19
20

Do we need to deal with

MR. EVERSHED:

If you would like to now or later, it

just -I would rather deal with it now.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. EVERSHED:

Okay.

23

(End of Bench Conference.)

24

THE COURT:

25

Okay.

Mr. Mears, you can go ahead and

step down.
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